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ABSTRACT
There has been an extensive body of literature studying the link between ownership
structure and firm performance. Some of them focus on the performance difference across
ownership types (i.e. state vs foreign vs private domestic). On the other hand, some stud-
ies stress ownership structure on the fraction of ownership based on agency theory (i.e.
majority versus minority) and its derivatives (e.g. ultimate ownership, cross listing). How-
ever, an important element has not been explored while discussing ownership structure
of firms which is the concept of publicness of firms. Publicness is important to explain to
which extent an organization is related with governmental institutions. In fact, there are
many engagements of firms with governmental bodies (e.g. deposit and lending from and
to public organization). In this present paper, I provide a comprehensive literature review
on the intersection between publicness level of firms and ownership structure. Going
deeper, I also provide a literature review on the measurement of publicness and postulate
a model to link between these two and firm performance as a venue for future studies.
ABSTRAK
Banyak literatur yang mempelajari hubungan antara struktur kepemilikan dan kinerja perusahaan.
Beberapa di antaranya fokus pada kinerja perusahaan dengan tipe kepemilikan yang berbeda
(yaitu pemerintah vs asing vs swasta domestik). Di sisi lain, beberapa studi menekankan struktur
kepemilikan pada pemecahan kepemilikan berdasarkan teori agensi (yaitu mayoritas versus
minoritas) dan derivatifnya (misalnya ultimate ownership, cross listing). Namun, elemen penting
tentang struktur kepemilikan perusahaan dalam konsep publicness perusahaan belum banyak
dieksplorasi. Publicness penting untuk menjelaskan sejauh mana sebuah organisasi berhubungan
dengan lembaga pemerintah. Pada kenyataannya, ada banyak keterlibatan perusahaan dengan
lembaga pemerintah (misalnya simpanan dan pinjaman dari dan ke organisasi publik). Tulisan
ini, memberikan tinjauan literatur secara komprehensif tentang hubungan antara tingkat public-
ness perusahaan dan struktur kepemilikan. Lebih jauh, saya juga memberikan tinjauan literatur
tentang pengukuran publicness dan mendalilkan model untuk menghubungkan antara kedua hal
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The concept of publicness has been extensively
studied in management and organization areas
pioneered by Bozeman (1987), Nutt & Backoff
(1993), and Bozeman & Bretschneider (1994). Ba-
sically, it could be considered as to which extent
an organization is related with governmental in-
stitutions (Untoro & Angriawan, 2016). More for-
mally, Anderson (2012) defines that publicness is
a characteristic of an organization reflecting the
extent to which the organization is influenced by
political power. The publicness level of an organi-
zation becomes important due to it has been a tool
to differentiate between private and public orga-
nizations (Boyne, 2002). Goldstein & Naor (2005)
mention that there are 4 dimensions of publicness
which are ownership, goal setting, funding, and
control.
It is, however, slightly different with the
concept of government-controlled firms or state-
owned enterprises that have been explored by
economics, finance, and accounting scholars (e.g.
Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Goldeng, Grünfeld, &
Benito, 2008; Prabowo et al., 2014). Aulich (2010)
also point out that publicness is different with
ownership, it is more on control and connected-
ness rather than on ownership. Most of studies on
the government-controlled firms argue that dis-
entangling between public and private is a dichoto-
mous and there is no grey area in between. The
publicness concept takes the different perspective
in which the difference between public and pri-
vate firms is continuous not discrete (Goldstein &
Naor, 2005). Therefore, rather than using a dummy
variable to measure the publicness, scholars in
management build some indicators to measure the
degree (level) of publicness. However, the mea-
surements (constructs) are mostly taken using self-
reporting questionnaire which is criticized due to
more likely to be bias.
Most papers studying publicness in empiri-
cal way take the context in the public service or-
ganization such as universities (Bozeman &
Bretschneider, 1994; Feeney & Welch, 2012), hos-
pitals (Goldstein & Naor, 2005), public transport
(Paget-Seekins & Tironi, 2016), and local govern-
ment (Untoro & Angriawan, 2016). Little is found
on the publicness level of profit organization
(firms). In this present paper, I provide a compre-
hensive literature review on the intersection be-
tween publicness level of firms, ownership and
political relatedness. Here, I focus on the public-
ness level of firms or corporate as in fact, there
are many engagements of firms with governmen-
tal bodies even though those firms are privately-
owned firms. For instance, in the banking indus-
try, both public and private banks are related to
the government through for example deposit and
lending from and to public organization. Going
deeper, I also provide a literature review on the
measurement of publicness and postulate a model
to link between these two and firm performance
as a venue for future studies.
PUBLICNESS OF FIRMS, OWNERSHIP, AND
POLITICAL RELATEDNESS
Ownership structure has been extensively
studied in finance, management, economics, ac-
counting, and public administration. Agency
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is most used
perspective to explain the role of ownership struc-
ture on the organization outcomes. This theory
basically explains that the separation of ownership
and control could lead to agency problem where
there is self-interested behaviour of managers
(agent) which is not in line with the primary ob-
jective of the stockholders (principal). It then could
also lead to the conflict between majority (agent)
and minority shareholders/ principal (see paper
of Bhaumik & Gregoriou (2010) for more compre-
hensive review on this particular issue).
Many empirical papers look at the outcome
(performance) differences between public and pri-
vate firms (e.g. Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). In a
seminal paper, Shleifer & Vishny (1994) argue that
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public (state-owned) firms could be less efficient
due to the self-interest of politicians. Some other
empirical papers find the same results which is the
lower performance and less efficient government-
controlled firms compared to private firms due to
political and social aspects misallocation of lend-
ing (e.g. Dinc, 2005), excess employees (Wu, Wu,
& Rui, 2010), and others. Few papers find differ-
ently either insignificant different or higher per-
formance of state-owned enterprises than private
firms (see Untoro (2016) for detailed literature
review in this particular field). For instance,
Prabowo et al. (2014) argue that due to their higher
market power, state-owned enterprises are still
more profitable even though they may be less ef-
ficient than private firms.
Some papers focus on the difference perfor-
mance between domestic and foreign-controlled
firms (e.g. Claessens, Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001;
Detragiache, Tressel, & Gupta, 2008). A number
of papers find positive effect of foreign entry es-
pecially in developing countries due to technologi-
cal advancement and better in human resources
and human capital making foreign firms more ef-
ficient compared to domestic firms. The other
strand of literature regarding ownership structure,
standing on the agency theory as explained ear-
lier, is on the fraction of ownership (i.e. majority
versus minority) and its derivatives (e.g. ultimate
ownership, cross listing, …) on some aspects such
as performance and firm value, see for example
the paper of Lepetit, Saghi-Zedek, & Tarazi (2015).
On the other hand, those from management
and public administration have also introduced the
concept of publicness which is to which extent an
organization is related with governmental insti-
tutions (Untoro & Angriawan, 2016). Similarly,
Anderson (2012) also defines that the extent to
which firms influenced and benefitted by political
authority can define the publicness level of firms.
By using this definition, the correlation between
government ownership (public) and publicness
level may not be so high due to some private in-
stitutions may have strong relations with govern-
mental institutions. It has been proved in some
finance and economics papers that firm political
connections of firms are not only embedded in the
state-owned enterprises but some private firms
also have links with the political power. For ex-
ample the paper of Nys, Tarazi, & Trinugroho
(2015), they provide empirical evidence that some
private banks are also politically connected in
some ways such as ownership by politicians or
hiring politicians or former top bureaucrats in their
board. Therefore, the definition of publicness level
of firms is apparently opaque. I, therefore, argue
here that the concept of publicness of firms is closer
to the concept of political relatedness rather than
the concept of government ownership of firms.
There is a strong intersection between these two
which could be combined for future studies as
mostly people disentangle between publicness and
political relatedness.
MEASURING PUBLICNESS LEVEL OF FIRMS
As I argue that the publicness level of firm
is the extent to which a firm has relation with gov-
ernmental organization, it is therefore, I could
suggest some new venues of research in the fu-
ture especially with regards to the measurement
of publicness level of firms. It is previously ex-
plained that most studies on publicness mostly
conducted by those from management and public
administration fields have built the measures of
publiness level of organizations mainly using self-
reporting survey employing questionnaire. For
example, our previous study (Untoro &
Angriawan, 2016) adopt the widely-used 14 ques-
tions introduced by Frederickson et al. (1976) to
measure the publicness level of organization. An
exception is the paper of Goldstein & Naor (2005)
in which they measure publicness level of firms
by combining objective measures for the 3 dimen-
sions of publicness which are ownership (profit or
non-profit), goal setting, as well as funding, and
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self-reporting survey for capturing one dimension
of publicness which is control. Bozeman (1987) also
explains the various sources to differentiate be-
tween public and private organizations which are
ownership, funding, and political control. How-
ever, most of them lack of objectives tools (mea-
sures) to precisely derive the three dimensions into
measurable proxies.
In this present paper, I introduce the new
measures of publicness level of organization, more
particular profit organization or firm. I therefore
argue that firms have more engagements with
political power could have a higher level of pub-
licness although they are “formally” categorized
as private firms. Engagements with political au-
thority could be, for example banking firms, in the
form of deposits banks receive from governmen-
tal agencies and lending to governmental organi-
zations including state-owned enterprises. Nys,
Tarazi, & Trinugroho (2015) explain that banks
having connections with political authority have
easier access to get deposit funding from govern-
mental organizations. Similarly, in the non-finan-
cial firms, the relations could be measured through
the sales to the governmental institutions or the
number of projects of governmental institutions
runs by the firms to total outstanding projects.
Agrawal & Knoeber (2001) argue that the need of
political connections is more prevalent for compa-
nies with larger sales to government, exports, and
lobbying.
As it is argued before that the degree of
publicness of firms are related to the political re-
latedness they have, the other measure or proxy
that could be considered to reflect the publicness
level of firms is the composition of the members
of board of directors. For firms hiring more poli-
ticians and former bureaucrats on the board, it
could be considered that those firms are more con-
nected with the political power. Therefore, it could
be argued that they have a higher level of public-
ness.
However, it should also be pointed out that
publicness level of firms which is measured by its
degree of political relatedness could have an
endogeneity issue. According to Agrawal &
Knoeber (2001), the level of political relatedness
is strongly affected by the specific characteristics
of firms. Therefore, when doing an empirical
study, the issue of endogeneity should be tackled
by for example using instrumental variables.
PUBLICNESS, OWNERSHIP, AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE
In this section, I provide some venues for
future studies to empirically examine the link be-
tween publicness of firms and ownership as well
as their impact on firm performance. It has been
extensively done that ownership, both with re-
gards to the type of ownership and the fraction of
ownership, has an impact on firm performance.
On the other hand, some papers have also dis-
cussed the impact of publicness level on some or-
ganization outcomes. Then, related to the previ-
ous explanation, I am questioning whether there
is an intersection between publicness and owner-
ship in affecting firm performance. More specifi-
cally, is the effect of publicness level of firms which
is reflected by political relatedness is different
across type of ownership and the fraction of own-
ership?
By taking this new perspective that I argue
earlier in which for profit organization, the level
of its publicness could be related to the political
relatedness, first I argue that the higher public-
ness level of firms would lead to better or lower
performance. In some papers discussing the po-
litical relatedness of firms, there are some chan-
nels to argue that political relatedness has a posi-
tive impact on firm performance through access
to financing, access to government project, access
in the legal aspect and others (see paper of Nys,
Tarazi, & Trinugroho (2015) for the details). How-
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ever, some also contend that the positive impact
is only in the short period, in the long-term politi-
cal relatedness will decrease performance. Even,
some others reveal that the effect in the short term
is negative which may be caused by the fact that
dependency on political relatedness is susceptible.
Therefore, in this particular causality, the impact
of publicness level of firms on their performance
could be positive or negative.
Second, going deeper, I argue that there is
an interaction between publicness and ownership
structure in affecting the firm performance. It
could be hypothesized that the effect of publiness
on firm performance is different across ownership
structure. In here, ownership structure which is
disentangled into 2 categories. The first one is
ownership structure based on type of ownership
which could be state-owned firms, foreign-con-
trolled firms and private-domestic firms. The sec-
ond one is ownership structure based on the frac-
tion of ownership which could be measured by
the difference between control right and cash flow
right for each firm according to those working on
the agency conflict between majority and minor-
ity shareholders (e.g. Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002;
Baek, Kang, & Lee, 2006). It could be argued that
the expected signs of the moderating effect dif-
ferent across the type and structure. For example,
the effect of publicness on firm performance may
not be significant for state-owned firms. However,
the effect may be significant for foreign firms. It is
in line with the previous study of Sutopo,
Trinugroho, & Damayanti (2017) in which the ef-
fect of political connections on bank performance
is more pronounced for foreign-controlled banks.
While to test the proposed model on the
contingency effect of ownership structure in the
relation between publicness level of firm and firm
performance, the empirical model to be estimated
is as follows:




In this present paper, I discuss deeply on
the publicness of firms. I start with the definition
that publicness is the extent to which the organi-
zation is influenced by political power. Further, I
combine the concept of publicness in the manage-
ment perspective, agency theory of ownership
structure, and the political relatedness that has been
widely discussed in finance and economics.
Moreover, I introduce some potential mea-
sures of publicness level of firms which closes to
the measure of political relatedness. Following the
introduction of the new publicness measures, I
propose some 2 hypotheses in the impact of pub-
licness level of firms on their performance. There
are 2 competing hypotheses in this particular rela-
tionship. On the one hand, it could be argued that
the higher the publicness level of firms, it could
help them to improve performance. On the other
hand, however, some argue that dependency on
the help of political authority could create poor
performance due to the expropriation of politicians
and susceptible to political turnover. I also pro-
pose an empirical model when ownership struc-
ture is included as a moderating factor. Arguably,
the moderating effect of ownership is different
across type and structure.
Discussing the publicness and political re-
latedness of firms is practically important espe-
cially in emerging countries more particular with
regard to 2 aspects especially when the new mea-
sures of publicness is considered. First, the limita-
tion on politicians having ownership in firms may
be considered to be regulated to minimize the
grabbing hand behaviors in which they exploit
state-owned firms for the benefits of their own
firms. Second, as it is argued that the proportion
of deposits of governmental institutions in a bank
could be a proxy of publicness level of a bank,
imposing government budget, and funds of state-
owned enterprises to be placed in the state-owned
banks may discourage banking competition. How-
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ever, there may be an internal regulation among
governmental agencies to limit their deposits in
private banks.
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